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Abstract
In this thesis, I analyze the causes and consequences of the Asian
Crisis 1997 and simulate it with Dynare. The model includes financial
accelerator mechanism, which in part explains the dynamics and the
magnitude of the crisis via balance sheet effects. I find that the
major components of the crisis were highly similar to other crisis that
had happened in other emerging economies: High levels of foreign-
currency denominated debt, unsound financial regulation, and fixed
exchange rates with skewed valuation. Even though this simulation
do not specifically incorporated different exchange rate regimes into
the simulation, the previous literature draw a clear conclusion that
flexible exchange rates lessen the shock’s effects on the economy.
Thailand, as well as other ASEAN-countries during the crisis, faced
severe economic contraction as well as changes in political landscape:
Due to the crisis, Thailand’s GDP contracted over 10 percent, the
country lost almost a million jobs, and the stock exchange index fell
75 percent. In addition, the country underwent riots, resignation
of ministers, and several political changes towards more democratic
institutions, even though faced some backlash and re-entry of authoritarian
figures later. As the crisis worsened, IMF collected a large rescue
package that was given to ASEAN-countries with preconditioned austerity
policies.
The simulation with recalibrated parameter-values seems to be
relatively accurate. The dynamics and the impact of the crisis is
captured realistically with correct magnitudes. The financial accelerator
mechanism accounts a large part of the shock’s impact on investment
and companies net worth, but do not account much on overall decline
in output.
1
Ta¨ssa¨ tutkielmassa analysoin vuoden 1997 Aasian talouskriisin
syita¨ ja seurauksia, seka¨ simuloin kriisin Dynaren avulla. Malli sisa¨lta¨a¨ niin
sanotun rahoitusakseleraattorin, joka osaltaan selitta¨a¨ kriisin dynamiikkaa
ja voimakkuutta taseissa tapahtuvien muutosten kautta. Aasian kriisin
keskeiset taustatekija¨t eiva¨t olleet epa¨tavallisia, vaan muissakin kehittyvien
talouksien kriiseissa¨ on havaittu samoja riskitekijo¨ita¨. Na¨ita¨ ovat
muun muassa korkea toisessa valuutassa otettu velan ma¨a¨ra¨, huonosti
ja¨rjestetty rahoitusmarkkinoiden sa¨a¨ntely seka¨ kiintea¨t valuuttakurssit
epa¨luonnollisella hinnoittelulla. Vaikka ta¨ma¨n tutkielman simulaatio
ei erikseen sisa¨lla¨ eri valuuttakurssija¨rjestelmien vertailua, on aiempien
tutkimusten johtopa¨a¨to¨s selkea¨: Kelluva valuuttakurssi lieventa¨a¨ ylla¨tta¨va¨n
shokin vaikutuksia talouteen.
Thaimaa, kuten useat muut ASEAN-maat, kokivat merkitta¨va¨n
taantuman kriisin puhjetessa. Kriisilla¨ oli myo¨s vaikutuksia alueen
politiikkaan. Thaimaan BKT supistui yli 10 prosenttia, maa menetti
la¨hes miljoona tyo¨paikkaa ja po¨rssin yleisindeksi putosi 75 prosenttia.
Na¨iden lisa¨ksi maassa puhkesi laajat mellakat ja muutoksia poliittisessa
johdossa. Thaimaa koki merkitta¨via¨ institutionaalisia muutoksia, jotka
edistiva¨t hiljalleen autorita¨a¨risen alueen kehittymista¨ kohti la¨pina¨kyva¨mpa¨a¨ ja
laajempaa demokratiaa. Kriisin syvetessa¨ IMF ja¨rjesti merkitta¨va¨n
apupaketin, jonka avulla ASEAN-maat pystyiva¨t nousemaan nopeammin
lamasta. Paketin ehtoina oli useita tiukennuksia talous- ja veropolitiikan
harjoittamiseen.
Tutkielman simulaatio on suhteellisen tarkka, kun mallin parametrin
on kalibroitu vastaamaan Thaimaan kokemusta kriisista¨: Shokin vaikutukset
eri muuttujiin ovat muodoltaan ja voimakkuudeltaan realistiset. Mallin
keskio¨ssa¨ oleva rahoitusakseleraattori-mekanismi selitta¨a¨ suuren osan
shokin vaikutuksesta investointeihin ja yritysten nettoarvoon, mutta
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1 Introduction
Asian Financial Crisis began in July 1997 in Thailand. It spread throughout
the South-East Asia quickly and affected countries in the region profusely.
Economists have studied the occurrence and its causes and consequences in
order to understand it better. In addition, the point of interest has also
been the crisis’ similarities to other crisis in emerging economies. Given
the extensive literature, modelling, and knowledge today, the key factors
that increase the risks for crises as well as the dynamics on how crises often
spread in the economy are well known.
The main purpose of this thesis is answer following questions: How did
the widely spread monetary shock in Asia in 1997, later known as the Asian
Financial Crisis, affect a small open economy, the Thailand’s economy? What
caused the crisis? How did the economy get back to its natural economic
equilibrium? I am conducting a simulation of the crisis using Christensen
& Dip (2007) model and calibrating the parameters in accordance with
Thailand’s experience. The model includes financial accelerator mechanism,
which plays a central role in explaining the crisis and its dynamics via balance
sheet effects. Similar models has been used extensively when simulating crisis
in emerging economies.
The key papers for this thesis are Gertler, Gilchrist & Natalucci (2007)
(Gertler et al. onwards), and the Christensen & Dip (2007). Both models
are highly similar and include the financial accelerator mechanism. The
financial accelerator mechanism is explained in detail in the literature review
-section. Gertler et al (2007) constructed and estimated a model on Asian
Crisis in accordance with Korea’s experience. Their model was accurate and
the financial accelerator mechanism played an important role: It explained
half of the decline in economic activity and output. Christensen & Dip (2007)
simulated similar model and calibrated it with post-1979 US data. They
tested the significance of the financial accelerator mechanism in explaining
crisis. They align with Gertler et al. (2007) by concluding that the results
provide evidence in favour of including the mechanism in the model. The
model without the mechanism was statistically rejected. With parameter-
values from Thailand’s central bank and relevant studies, I am expecting
that the model is able to account relatively well for Thailand’s experience
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in this thesis. It is expected that the financial accelerator mechanism and
balance sheet effects play a central role in explaining the impact of crisis in
this simulation as well.
Hence, the points of interest in this thesis are also the model’s accuracy
regarding to the effects of the shock to key economic variables, such as
GDP, consumption, inflation, and net worth of the companies, as well as the
investigation of the extent of balance sheet effects and financial accelerator
mechanism to overall decline in the economy. By analyzing and modeling
the occurrence carefully, the purpose is to understand monetary shocks, their
effects, and possible solutions better.
The impact of 1997 crisis was significant for ASEAN-countries1. According
to Berg (1999), the recession was the deepest in the area since World War
II. Thailand, South-Korea and Indonesia were hit the hardest. Naturally,
the crisis also had several political consequences in ASEAN-countries which
expanded to have global implications as well. For example in Indonesia, the
president and the military leader Suharto had to resign after being forced
to apply a emergency loan from IMF, which further revealed the corrupted
state of the government and worsened riots in the country. In addition,
the crisis and IMF’s intervention caused a rise in anti-Western sentiment
across ASEAN-countries. Especially George Soros, an Hungarian-American
investor and hedge-fund manager, was seen to be one of the main players
initiating the crisis.
As the latest COVID-19 has shown, an unanticipated shock to an economy
can still hit quickly with severe consequences. Hence, it is important to have
a profound understanding on the dynamics and factors of crises in order to
dampen them down fast.
1ASEAN, abbreviation from ”Association of Southeast Asian Nations”, is a
intergovernmental organization in South-East Asia that comprises ten countries. It focuses




The literature review -section focuses on five topics: Financial crises on
small open economies, relevant modeling and framework, financial accelerator
mechanism, the causes and effects of the Asian Crisis 1997 on Thailand’s
economy, and the political consequences of the crisis. The topics are discussed
separately, but some level of overlapping is present. For example, the first
part’s discussion on financial crises’ common factors are sought to be described
pragmatically, connecting them primarily to Thailand and the Asian Crisis.
Before proceeding further, it is worthwhile to point out that different
crises often have slightly different causes and effects as the timing and conditions
vary. Therefore, one model or explanation is likely unable to explain thoroughly
the questions and phenomena of interest in general, even though the core
principles, actors and rigidities of the models are similar, and the crises often
share common features. The collection of papers discussed in the following
chapters is not all inclusive but rather a relatively compact review of the
essential papers and views for this research.
2.1 Financial Crises on Small Open Economies
Feldstein (2003) delivers a profound analysis on the factors that are related to
financial crises and economic downturn in emerging economies. He emphasizes
that the type of exchange rate regime, occurring debt deflation, growing
current account deficit, levels of foreign exchange liabilities and reserves,
state and quality of financial supervision, and the level of restrictions on
capital account convertibility affect the likelihood and severity of crises in
emerging market economies.
He connects the fixed interest rate, current account deficit, and debt
deflation together by arguing that growing current account deficit caused
by fixed exchange rate was, for example, the primary cause for Asian and
Mexican Crises in 1990s. In Thailand, the initially stable and trusted baht-
dollar peg encouraged companies and investors to borrow relatively cheap
dollars. The country had high interest rates, and the companies and investors
were told by the Thai government that the exchange rate would remain
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unchanged. Eventually, the current account deficit grew to unsustainable
levels.
At first, the foreign lenders were induced (by high interest rates) to
continue financing the continuously growing current account deficit, but
eventually the risks and fear of devaluation grew too high. As the foreign
lenders were no longer willing to extend loans and provide additional financing,
they started to draw their money out. In addition, as the domestic residents
began to convert their funds and the trust towards domestic currency weakened
further, the economic decline and devaluation of currency became more
inevitable. The government tried to protect the currency with the usage
of foreign exchange reserves and forward market moves, but eventually had
no other choice than let the baht float. Moreover, as baht devalued, Thailand
faced the consequences of debt deflation and deteriorating balance sheets as
large amounts of the debt were denominated in dollars. Feldstein (2003)
points out that Thailand was not unusual in “experiencing the ravages of
debt deflation” when baht devalued. Analyzes of other crises in emerging
economies have also shown that high levels of foreign currency -denominated
private debt, such as the debt denominated in dollars, is risky for the economy
in a long run. (Feldstein 2003.)
Hence, corporations and countries may avoid high levels of foreign currency-
denominated debt in order to reduce riskiness and harmful consequences
of the currency’s sudden devaluation. In a national level, large amounts
of short-term foreign currency liabilities compared to the country’s foreign
exchange reserves increases the probability for crisis. In practice, this problem
can be mainly avoided by sound financial supervision and regulating the
amount of additional foreign currency liabilities relative to the country’s
foreign currency reserves. However, countries may be reluctant to hold large
foreign currency reserves as the opportunity cost for holding relatively low
yielding reserves, like dollar-denominated ones, is high. Adopting floating
exchange rate initially and thereby avoiding a highly overvalued currency
would reduce the risk for currency crisis. (Feldstein 2003.)
The rest of the factors presented by Feldstein (2003) were the restrictions
on the capital account convertibility2 and the state of financial supervision.
2Restrictions for foreigners and local residents to buy and sell currency for portfolio
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By establishing restrictions on capital account convertibility, an economy
can reduce possibly volatile capital flows and stabilize domestic financial
markets. However, economies also benefits from capital inflows and therefore
restrictions may slow down the investments and growth. Feldstein (2003)
presents an example of a compromise arrangement which was conducted in
Chile. In Chile, short-term capital inflows were taxed by requiring the money
to be held in the country for a period of time without paid interest. This kind
of an arrangement could provide most of the advantages of foreign capital
inflows and reduce the excess volatility of speculative behaviour.
However, Chilean-type restrictions on capital account convertibility have
caused skepticism among economists. For example, Krugman (1999) argues
that the short-term loans are not the only possible sources of capital flight. He
points that even if all of the foreign debt is long-term, it is unlikely to actually
protect the country from a financial crisis. If a crisis is expected to occur, the
holders of domestic short-term debt will refuse to roll it over. This leads to
devaluing currency and can cause bankrupts even though the foreign debts
were long-term. Nevertheless, well working financial system unarguably need
some financial supervision and healthy, but not too restrictive, regulation.
For example, Lauridsen (1998), and Nidhiprabha (1998) stresses the lack
of supervision and restrictions as highly important factors in Asian Crisis.
Krugman (1999) also points out, regardless of his critique towards Chilean-
type of restrictions, that some level and type of regulation are sound. Feldstein
(2003) emphasizes that had the banking supervision in Thailand been more
attentive, they would not have allowed the banks to accept so high levels
of dollar-denominated debt, given the artificially fixed exchange rate in the
country with inadequate levels of foreign currency reserves, and where the
borrowers generally did not have the ability to earn dollars. As an option,
banking supervision could mainly focus on the relative amount of foreign
currency debt and worry about the type of the debt secondarily. (Feldstein
2003.)
Kaminsky & Reinhard (1999), Gertler et al. (2007) and Ce´spedes, Chang
& Velasco (2000) also align with the statement regarding to the connection
between the chosen exchange rate regime and the severity of crisis. They
conclude that the areas with fixed exchange rate perform the worst. Gertler
investments
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et al. (2007) simulated counterfactual scenarios where the Korean economy
during the Asian Crisis 1997 would have had flexible and fixed exchange
rates. The scenario with flexible exchange rates did recover the fastest from
the shock and the one with fixed exchange rates performed the worst.
Kaminsky & Reinhard (1999) studied 20 countries from 1970 to mid-1995,
which encompassed 76 currency crises and 26 banking crises, and found a
connection between the need of defending the pegged exchange rate and the
probability for severe financial strain. They also found that the peak of a
banking crisis often comes after the currency crashes, i.e. in the case of fixed
exchange regime, when the central bank is forced to let the currency float
freely. This suggests that high interest rates that were set to defend the
exchange rate exacerbated existing problems or created new ones, such as
declined investments. Hence, the collapse of a currency can initially worsen
the banking crisis and activate a vicious spiral via the debt deflation, declined
net worth of companies and reduced investments. However, as Gertler et
al. (2007) demonstrated, staying with fixed exchange regime can be more
harmful in the long run, even though the devaluation of the currency can
hurt the economy at first. The connection between pegged exchange rate
and financial strains is shown to be existing long: For example, Eichengreen
(1992) showed that the countries which stayed on the gold standard during
the Great Depression suffered more severe economic and financial distress
than the ones who let their currency float earlier.
However, countries do have some rational grounding for initially adopting
fixed exchange rates, given the extensive literature about their riskiness.
Feldstein (2003) analyzes the pros and cons of the policy. He points out that
a fixed interest rates help the country to achieve price stability by acting as
a nominal anchor. By eliminating excess volatility in the economy, foreign
investors are more likely to bring capital and in overall, doing business is
more convenient in a less unstable environment. However, if the situation
in the economy changes through time and the currency becomes highly
overvalued, the country with fixed exchange rates faces either high interest
rates, extensive usage of foreign currency reserves or abandoning the peg, or
possibly all of them sequentially. This chain of events happened in Thailand,
as described earlier. Instead, if a country adopts floating exchange rates,
a growing current account deficit will generally be self-correcting as the
currency devalues in the markets. With devaluing currency, country’s export
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flourishes but the costs from foreign currency-denominated debt rises. However,
a floating currency can cause unnecessary volatility and slow down the economic
growth, especially if the country’s economy is fragile. Devereux, Lane & Xu
(2006) point out that price levels in emerging markets are in general more
sensitive to fluctuations in exchange rates compared to developed countries.
An exchange rate shock in emerging market economies often raises aggregate
inflation much faster, which makes the choosing of the right monetary policy
vital. Therefore, several emerging countries with underdeveloped financial
supervision and monetary system aim for stability and adopt fixed exchange
rates despite the risks. (Feldstein 2003.)
2.2 Modeling and Framework
There are similarities as well as differences between the models, approaches,
and conclusions used in different papers on financial crises and emerging
markets. Krugman (1999) points out, that there are roughly three “generations”
of models regarding to the financial crises in emerging economies. “First
generation” papers such as Krugman (1979) and Flood & Garber (1984)
emphasize that the crises are products of budget deficits: the need of the
government for seigniorage to cover the budget deficit eventually leads to
speculative attacks and the collapse of a fixed exchange rate. “Second generation”
models, such as Obstfeld (1994), emphasize that pursuing expansionary monetary
policy under fixed exchange rate lead to distrust towards the currency and
causes pressure on interest rates, which eventually lead to economic decline.
Gertler et al. (2007), Ce´spedes, Chang & Velasco (2000) and Krugman
(1999) belong to the “third generation” that emphasizes the roles of the
exchange rate policy and the balance sheet effect. Aghion, Bacchetta &
Banerjee (2000), Devereux, Lane & Xu (2006), and the model of this thesis,
Christensen & Dip (2008), basically also belong to this same subset. Given
the frictions in credit markets, these papers focus on how deteriorating
borrowers’ balance sheets enhance the financial accelerator mechanism that
amplifies the financial distress further. The literature review regarding to
the models and framework will be focusing on the “third generation” paper.
Ce´spedes, Chang & Velasco (2000) focused on the connections between
exchange rates, balance sheets, and different economic variables in a small
open economy. In the case of an external shock, domestic real interest rates
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are higher under a peg, which have negative effects on current investments
and future output. Surprisingly, they also argue that after an financial shock,
the net worth of companies is lower under fixed exchange rates than in the
case of flexible ones. The usual conclusion is often the contrary, especially
with foreign currency -denominated debt; if a company has foreign currency
-denominated debt, the overall reduction in the net worth after a shock is
higher under flexible exchange rates as the relative share of debt increases
due to devaluing domestic currency. Authors argue that some level of real
depreciation occur under both exchange rate regimes, but in the case of fixed
rates, the previously mentioned effect of higher fall in output eventually leads
to a higher overall decline in net worth. However, the authors did not test
their claim’s validity with data, so the conclusion must be handled with
caution. (Ce´spedes, Chang & Velasco 2000.)
Aghion, Bacchetta & Banerjee (2000) analyzed the optimal interest rate
policy when a country faces a currency crisis. They conclude that increasing
interest rates has ambiguous effect on firms which have foreign currency
liabilities. On the one hand, increased domestic interest rates decrease the
burden from the foreign currency liabilities but on the other hand, makes
it more difficult to borrow money domestically. They conclude that if the
proportion of foreign currency debt is not large or when the domestic investment
and production are sensitive to changes in interest rates, it might not be
optimal to implement tight monetary policy after a currency crisis. (Aghion,
Bacchetta & Banerjee 2000.)
Devereux, Lane & Xu (2006) studied the effects of different monetary
policies as the economy faces an exogenous shock. They compared three
different monetary policy rules: a fixed exchange rule and two types of
inflation targeting rules (CPI inflation targeting and more specified subset
of the CPI inflation targeting which focused only on the prices of non-traded
goods). They highlight the importance of the degree of exchange rate pass-
through3, With high pass-through, i.e. when the prices of goods response
quickly to changes in exchange rates, fixed exchange rates and CPI inflation
targeting stabilize inflation (and exchange rates), but at the expense of
instability in the real economy. In the case of low exchange rate pass-through,
the tradeoff between inflation volatility and output volatility is eliminated by
3i.e. the responsiveness of imported goods’ prices to changes in exchange rates.
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focusing on inflation targeting rules. Policy maker can target CPI inflation
and allow high nominal exchange rate volatility in order to stabilize the real
economy. Authors claim, that by following a price stability rule, the output
volatility as well as inflation volatility are lower than under the fixed exchange
rule. Therefore, the overall conclusion of Devereux, Lane & Xu (2006) aligns
with the other papers: Policy makers should set flexible exchange rates.
Chari, Kehoe & McGrattan (2003) emphasize that the actual reason for
financial crises could be productivity shocks. They show that the efficiency
and labor wedges account for a majority of the decline. However, the decline
in productivity may be an outcome of the crisis, not a cause. Gertler et al.
(2007) demonstrates that the most of the variation in measured productivity
can be explained by appealing to endogenous utilization of capital. Within
their model, declines in output and investment cause decrease in capital
utilization, which leads to declined productivity. They use the electricity
utilization as a proxy for capital utilization (which according to Burnside,
Eichenbaum & Rebelo (1995) is a decent proxy) and showed that it fell
sharply in tandem with measured productivity.
However, the majority of these papers discussed deliver qualitative results.
The merit of Gertler’s et al. (2007) paper from the perspective of this research
is the development of quantitative model and actual measurements on the
impacts of the occurred phenomenon. Hence, some of the parameter-values
of interest are taken from Gertler et al (2007). Christiano, Gust & Roldos
(2002) also conducted a quantitative analysis. They focused on the effects of
an interest rate cut during a crisis, i.e. monetary transmission, and analyzed
the conditions under which the cut has positive effects on the economy. They
argue that when the model includes frictions in adjusting the level of output
and in the rate at which the output can be used in other parts of the economy,
the cut in the interest rate will lead to declined employment and output. In
the scenario where the frictions are excluded from the model, a cut promotes
economic upswing.
However, Christiano, Gust & Roldos (2002) did not test their model’s
performance with real data. Therefore, Gertler’s et al. (2007) which has
been demonstrated to match an actual crisis, provides more valuable and
practical information for this research. In addition, the Korean economy
(which was under their investigation), was relatively similar to Thailand’s
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economy and the crisis of interest was the same. Both countries had fixed
exchange rates but were forced to abandon the peg and let the currency float
after the crisis hit the economy. However, the economic conditions between
Korea and Thailand are not perfectly alike. Therefore, the model will be
calibrated somewhat differently with new parameter-values.
Christensen & Dip (2007) estimated their model with post-1979 US data.
The model is based on Bernanke et al (1999). Even though US is not
considered as an emerging economy, the model is de facto highly similar
to the ones. The main reasons for choosing their model as a basis for this
thesis was that the model was tested, calibrated, and demonstrated to be
accurate. In addition, the Dynare-codes for their model can be found from
the Macroeconomic Model Data Base4. For practical purposes, it is sound
to begin with initially working coding and rewrite, -organize, and calibrate
it afterwards.
The core framework of their model is similar to Ce´spedes, Chang &
Velasco (2000) and Gertler et al. (2007). For the sake of clarity and transparency,
it might be worthwhile to point out that Bernanke’s, Gertler’s & Gilchrist’s
(1999) financial accelerator framework is based on earlier works of Kiyotaki &
Moore (1997) and Bernanke & Gertler (1989). The mechanism connects the
borrower’s balance sheet to the terms of credit and to the demand for capital.
It magnifies the effects of a shock and, for example, according to Gertler et
al. (2007), explained about a half of the decline in economic activity in Korea
in 1997.
2.3 Financial Accelerator Mechanism
Korinek (2011) and Bernanke & Gertler (1989) explains the dynamics of
the financial accelerator mechanism. The mechanism initiates from the
connection between the financial markets and the real economy as firms need
external financing for their investments and growth. Firm’s ability to borrow
depends mainly on its net worth and in the case of international financing,
also on country-level risk-factors. Given the asymmetric information in
financial markets, especially on international level, the lenders are likely to
4www.macromodelbase.com
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have imperfect information about the borrower’s true solvency. Therefore,
lenders often require borrowers to set forth their ability to pay the loan
back, usually in a form of collateralized assets, as well as with some level
of additional costs to cover the risk premium. In the case when the value
of these collateralized assets fall and balance sheets deteriorate, firms net
worth decline and their ability for additional financing gets more difficult
and expensive. Decreased economic activity cuts the asset prices down
and in the case of having foreign currency liabilities, devaluing currency
increases the debt burden, deteriorating the balance sheets further. This
cyclical process of falling asset prices, deteriorating balance sheets, tightening
financing conditions and declining economic activity is called the financial
accelerator. It explains in part, how a small change in financial markets can
eventually have a large impact on the economy. According to Kiyotaki &
Moore (1997), this dynamic interaction between asset prices in borrowers’
balance sheets and credit limits turns out to be the transmission mechanism
by which the effects of these shocks are amplified. (Korinek 2011.)
Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist (1996) emphasize that the financial accelerator
is based on three assumptions that are also robust to actual findings. Firstly,
external finance is more expensive than internal one, unless the external
finance is fully collateralized. This higher cost of external finance reflects the
agency costs of lending that arises from asymmetric information. Secondly,
the external finance premium is inversely correlated with the borrower’s
net worth. This assumption is analysed more profoundly soon. The third
assumption is that a fall in the borrower’s net worth reduces the borrower’s
spending, production and the ability to get external financing. The third
point amplifies the financial accelerator’s effects: as a negative shock to
the economy reduces the net worth of firms (borrowers from the financial
perspective), the spending and production effects are also larger. (Bernanke,
Gertler & Gilchrist 1996.)
The second assumption that borrower’s net worth and the agency costs of
investment are inversely correlated forms the basis for balance sheet effects:
High or growing borrower net worth, i.e. “credit-worthiness”, reduces the
agency costs and risk premia of financing investments and vice versa; declining
borrower’s net worth, as in the times of debt-deflation, can cause fluctuations,
increased agency costs and declined investments. Hence, borrower net worth
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is often higher when the economy does well and the agency costs decline5.
The inverse correlation has another important implication: exogenous shocks
to borrower net worth that occur independently of economy-wide output
can initiate real fluctuations. Gertler (1998) pointed out that deteriorating
credit-market conditions, such as sharp increases in bankruptcies and insolvencies,
rising levels of real debt, declining asset prices and bank failures, are hence
not only the consequences of a declining economy, but can actually be the
central factors that initially depress the economy. (Bernanke & Gertler 1989.)
2.4 The Asian Crisis 1997 — Thailand’s Economy
The Asian Crisis fully began in July 1997. Thailand’s currency baht was
pegged competitively to US Dollars (25 bath to a dollar) and faced severe
speculative attack (Feldstein 2003). Eventually, as the Thai government ran
out of foreign currency reserves which were used to defend the currency,
bath was let to float on 2nd of July. This caused significant devaluation
of the currency, large-scale distrust and chain reaction of events, which
culminated into a region-wide crisis (Khan 2004, 2). The crisis spread around
the Asia, affecting Indonesia, South-Korea, Malesia, Philippines, and Hong
Kong. After massive interventions and new policies, the countries were able
to recover. According to Krugman (1998), the crisis and its impact were
largely unanticipated, even though the growing levels of current account
deficits in Southeast Asia as well as the countries’ weak immunity to financial
crises were known.
Lauridsen (1998) and Corsetti, Pesenti & Roubini (1999) deliver analyses
on the causes and consequences of the crisis on Thailand. They emphasize
that the initial reasons for the crisis were the growing current account deficit
and careless lending/borrowing under fixed exchange rate regime, combined
with the accumulation of nonperforming loans in the financial sector. According
to Corsetti, Pesenti & Roubini (1999), Thailand’s current account deficit was
one of the highest in the region: over 6 percent of GDP virtually in every
year in 1990s, approaching 9 percent in 1995 and 1996. In addition to the
fixed exchange rate, Thailand had relatively high domestic interest rates.
For example, the domestic borrowers were able to borrow money off-shore 11
5Net worth is procyclical, so agency costs raise during recession
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Figure 1: Exchange rate between US Dollar and Thai Baht
with 5-8 percent, while the domestic rates were over 10 percent.(Lauridsen
1998.)
As a result, foreign investments flowed to Thailand at increasing pace
and led to significant increases in external, foreign currency debt. In the
early 1990s, the investments per GDP -ratio was averaging over 40 percent,
compared to the 25-30 percent ratios a decade earlier. From the beginning
of 1990s to the spring of 1997, the external debt rose from 40$ billion to 80$
billion and exceeded 90$ billion in the autumn 1997. In addition, the total
outstanding debt per GDP -ratio increased from 34 percent to 51. According
to Nidhiprabha (1998), almost 70 percent of total foreign debt was private
debt and large proportion of it was short-term. Therefore, the unexpected
and sharp devaluation of the baht increased the real levels of debt significantly
in the firms where the debt was denominated in dollars.(Lauridsen 1998.)
The speculative bubble in Thailand grew as the investors and companies
did not have enough places to invest money soundly. As a result, a large
proportion of the new investments were non-productive. A significant amount
of money flowed to the real estate sector and inflated prices. According to
Lauridsen (1998), the number of new houses built in 1992-1996 was double
the estimate in the national plan. Hence, the supply of housing was much
higher than demand; vacancy rates of residential and office apartments were
17
25-30 and 14 percent, respectively. However, the land values in Bangkok kept
growing and eventually, surpassed even the ones of San Francisco. Thurow
(1998) described the peculiarity of the grossly inflated prices by pointing out
that ”a city where per capita productivity is less than one tenth that of San
Francisco, should not have higher land values”.
Nidhiprabha (1998) analyzes the effect of financial liberation to crisis.
In Thailand, gradual financial liberation was already undertaken in the early
1990s. Prematurely and without sound financial institutions, the Thai government
began to free the financial sector. This was conducted by calling on the
market mechanism to level the interest rates and by forming several financial
institutions in order to acquire foreign funds from international financial
markets. Feldstein (2003) also highlight the effects of relatively premature
liberalization policies by pointing out that the Anand’s government’s decision
in 1992 to establish the Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBF)
made it possible for banks to borrow foreign currencies abundantly abroad
and lend the money in Thailand. However, the process of gradual financial
liberalization ended in 1995, as the economy became overheated and first
alarming signals from high current account deficit arise. Due to premature
liberalization, Thailand undertook too much off-shore borrowing. By 1996,
the BIBF’s lending to domestic companies amounted to almost twice the size
of the monetary base. Thus, the vulnerability of Thai economy was already
high before the July 1997. In fact, the currency attack against baht had
already began in July 1996. (Nidhiprabha 1998.)
Thai economy began to slow down in 1996; GDP’s growth rate was
the lowest in a decade and due to the appreciated value of the baht, the
export declined. The baht appreciated because Dollar, to which the baht
was pegged, had appreciated. This sudden slump in exports accelerated
the currency attacks, which led to high interbank rates and the usage of
foreign currency reserves. In the spot foreign exchange markets, the Bank of
Thailand used over 23 billion US$ of its reserves in order to defend the baht
before giving up. Baht lost half of its value, settling around 50 baht to a dollar
-exchange rate. In addition, the Thailand’s stock exchange index fell by 35
percent in 1996 and plunged further by 56 percent in 1997. (Nidhiprabha
1998.)
Before the crisis, Thailand had low unemployment rates. In 1996. the
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unemployment rate was just 1.1 percent, but rose to 3.4 percent in 1998.
These rates still sounds relatively low in international standards, but nevertheless,
the increase was over 200 percent. In absolute standards, almost a million
jobs were lost. Moreover, the real wages fall almost 10 percent. (Bulletin on
Asia-Pacific Perspectives (2002.)
After the crisis spread further, the IMF collected a rescue package that
was the second largest bail-out in the history at the time. The total value
of the package was over 17$ billion. Within the bail-out package, IMF
demanded Thailand to adopt an austerity program and restructuring policies,
where taxation were increased and fiscal spending cut significantly. The Bank
of Thailand followed the requirements and in addition, suspended several
debt-ridden finance companies. Eventually, the Thai economy as well as the
South-East Asia as a whole began to recover from the crisis. In Thailand,
interbank rate declined from 25 percent of 1997 to 8 percent in September
1998. The share of short term foreign currency debt in private sector declined
and foreign direct investments rose to 3.3$ billion, compared to 1.8$ billion in
the corresponding period in 1997. Eventually, Thailand’s economy recovered
and continued to develop rather quickly. The country was even able to pay
its loans back to IMF four years ahead of schedule. (Feldstein 2002.)
2.5 Political Consequences of the Crisis
Haggard (2000) analyzes the political aspects and the consequences the crisis
had on Asian countries in his book The Political Economy of the Asian
Financial Crisis. He states that before crisis, the political systems in the
region were mainly authoritarian or semi-democratic, led by nontransparent
and somewhat corrupted governments. However, without democratic and
fully inclusive economic institutions, the countries nevertheless experienced
high levels of economic growth, investments, and even upward social mobility.
Before the crisis, the political ideology and the way of conducting business
in East, called as ”Asian values”6, did enjoy great support widely across the
6”Asian values” refers to a communitarian political ideology were loyalty towards
authorities such as corporation or nation, and high work ethics were praised with the cost
of individual freedom and self-determination. In the world of business, deals were based
on trust and respect, not on actual signed contracts. The way of conducting business
changed after the crisis into a more formal style with formal contracts.
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South-East Asia. (Haggard 2000, 217-218.)
In national levels, several countries in the area faced political turmoil
and riots. One of the main reason, in addition to the weakening economic
conditions, was the somewhat unwanted help from IMF. Haggard (2000,
7) argues that the tight policy content of the IMF’s programs created a
lot of heat among the citizens, politicians, and even economists. Some
economists claimed that IMF’s actions in fact sent markets a signal on
countries’ weak conditions, rather than stabilizing the declining exchange
rates and the economy. In addition, the kind of austerity program that
was partly seen as a foreign interuption on Asian’s businesses created some
anti-Western sentiment across ASEAN-countries. These negative attitudes
towards westerners grew stronger as Hungarian-American investor and hedge-
fund manager George Soros was claimed to be one of the key players who
initially started the speculative war against Asian currencies. Even Mahathir
bin Mohamad, the prime minister of Malaysia, publicly accused Soros of
speculating with currencies and ruining Malaysia’s economy. In 2006, several
years after the crisis, Mahathir bin Mohamad stated in the public press
conference that Soros had been innocent7.
Teehankee (2007) and MacIntyre (2001) analyze the political aspects of
the crisis and the atmospheric transitions from more authoritarian regimes
into more democratic ones, and vice versa. Mainly, the direction was towards
further democratization but for example in Thailand, earlier pro-democracy
uprising and institutional reforms faced backlash. The democratization that
had at least somewhat reduced the long-lasting military interventionism
in politics succeeded after the crisis, but led to a coup against Thaksin
Shinawatra’s goverment and the re-entry of military intervention several
years later. Lauridsen (1998) also points out that the democratization was
already occurring but advanced further after the crisis. He refers to the
Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) which aimed towards fair election
practices, eradicating ”money politics”, ensuring individual rights as well as
in overall, increasing political accountability. However, Teehankee (2007)
also argues that within the democratization, the crisis also led to a rise of
traditional populist politicians, like Shinawatra in Thailand. Shinawatra was
7”Malaysian ex-premier Mahathir and billionaire Soros end feud”. ABC News. Agence
France-Presse. December 15, 2006.
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able to register great electoral success in Thailand’s rural areas by promising,
for example, a million Baht for every village in Thailand.
In Thailand, the crisis led to a resignation of Prime Minister and General
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. Yongchaiyudh was the one initially announcing
that baht would not be devalued. At 6th of November 1997, six month
after devaluing and growing pressure from public as well as from the King,
he stepped aside. MacIntyre (2001) points out that the pressure towards
immobile, indecisive, and corrupted government was not unusual in Thailand’s
politics. He argues that also the governments led by Silapa-archa, Leekpai,
and Choonhavan all had suffered from similar problems and pressures; afflicted
by corruption scandals, built by unstable multiparty coalition arrangements,
and implementing very little on economic growth and inclusive economic
institutions. Teehankee (2007) also points out that the pressure came from
international financial institutions and markets, referring especially to the
levels of external finance premium rates and the trust towards Thai economy
as a whole.
In addition to Thailand, Indonesia was another country that faced steep
economic contraction and political changes. For example, Indonesian rupiah
devalued from its pre-crisis level of 2600 rupiah to one dollar to over 14 000
rupiah to a dollar at January 1998. Indonesian GDP contracted 13.5 percent
that year. After 32 years in policial power in Indonesia, the authoritarian
president Suharto was forced the resignation by the rising turbulence8 and
displeased pro-democracy movement. During the planning of IMF’s rescue
package, the level of corruptness in Suharto’s goverment became more apparent
as the government’s budget balance was examined more in detail. Eventually,
the Vice President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie replaced him and replaced
some controversial ministers from the cabinet.(Teehankee 2007.)
81998 riots in Indonesia, also known as 1998 Tragedy, eventually caused more than
thousand deaths and material damage worth over 3 trillion rupiah.
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3 The Model
The crisis and its impact on the economy is captured with a simple New
Keynesian small open economy model by Christensen & Dib (2007), where
financial accelerator mechanism connects the borrowers’ balance sheets’ conditions
to the terms of credit. The model is based on Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist
(1999). Through the previously described dynamics, an unanticipated shock
cause movements in asset prices, which provides the main source for overall
economic decline. The model will be calibrated further to match the 1997
crisis.
The model consists households, three types of domestic firms, foreign
sector and a government sector. Households work, save, and consume goods
that are either produced domestically or exported from abroad. Domestic
and exported goods are imperfect substitutes in this model.
Domestic economy includes three types of producers: entrepreneurs, capital
producers, and retailers. Entrepreneurs produce wholesale goods and finance
their acquisition of capital used in the production by borrowing from financial
intermediaries. Due to the asymmetric information in the capital market,
the demand for capital and its price (external financing premium) depends
on entrepreneurs’ financial position. In turn, capital producers build new
capital. The last type of the firms are the retailers. They costlessly package
wholesale goods supplied by the entrepreneurs in order to produce final
output. Retail market is monopolistic with rigid prices. The role of the
retail sector in this model is to provide the source of nominal price stickiness.
In addition, the model has an institution with authority on policies (central
bank) that takes care of the monetary policy. The central bank adjusts the
policy coefficients of output, inflation and money-growth rate according to its
predetermined targets. The monetary policy is conducted via adjustments
in nominal interest rate.
22
3.1 Households
Household’s utility comes from three sources; consuming products and services,
holding money balances, and having leisure time outside of work. Let Ct
be a composite of tradable consumption goods, Mt/pt real money balances,
and 1 − ht leisure, where ht denotes the labor supply. Consequently, the





where β is the periodical discount factor ensuring that the logical time-
preferences hold9.
Represented as a single-period constant elasticity of substitution -utility
function, the function takes the form:
u(·) = γet














+ ηlog(1− ht), (2)
where γ and η are structural parameters10 denoting the constant elasticity
of substitution between consumption, leisure and money. et and bt denote
”taste” shocks for consumption and money-demand, respectively. The shocks
follow first-order autoregressive processes, but are not specified further in this
thesis as the shocks are not realised in the subsequent simulation.
Households assets at period t consists nominal deposits Dt−1 and cash Mt.
The deposits are exclusively held in financial intermediaries (banks). These
deposits pay nominal interest rate, Rt, while cash held outside of banks
yield no interest. Households receive salary by working in firms Wtht, where
Wt represents, for simplifying reasons, the economy-wide nominal wage. In
addition, households receive divident payments Ω from retailer firms as well
as (lump-sum) transfer Tt from the monetary authority.
Households use their funds in accordance with their utility function, etc.
to consumption ct, and allocating the rest between cash Mt and deposits Dt.
9The standard assumption is that consuming etc. now at time t is in principle more
valuable than conducting it later. This means that 0 < β < 1.
10γ, η > 0.
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Hence, the household’s budget constraint is:
Ptct +Mt +Dt ≤ Wtht +Rt−1Dt−1 +Mt−1 + Tt + Ωt. (3)
3.1.1 Household optimization problem
Households maximize their expected lifetime utility functions subject to the























+ ηlog(1− ht) (5)
and
Ptct +Mt +Dt ≤ Wtht +Rt−1Dt−1 +Mt−1 + Tt + Ωt (6)
3.1.2 First order conditions of households








































11Equation (8) describes the demand of money. These equations are later simplified by
log-linearizing for Dynare-simulation. Due to practical purposes, the equations are the










where λ is the Langrangian multiplier weighting the budget constraint and




Capital producers repair depreciated capital and construct new capital goods.
They are assumed to operate under perfect competition. The production of
new capital is subject to shock xt, which affects the marginal efficiency of
investments.














where it denotes the investment goods that are created by buying final
goods from retailers in order to produce better investment goods, xtit. These









kt, describes the capital adjustment costs.
The first order condition of this problem is the Tobin’s Q equation:
Et
[






It connects the price of capital to the marginal adjustment costs. These
costs affect to the responsivity of investment to shocks and consequently to
the price of capital. Given the nature of the financial accelerator mechanism,
these costs play a central role in the model, affecting directly the entrepreneurs’
net worth. If the costs are excluded, the price of capital is constant, i.e, qt = 1
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for all t.
Given the depreciation rate δ and the shock χt, the capital stock evolves
as:
kt+1 = χtit + (1− δ)kt, (13)
which simply means that the capital stock at t+ 1 is equal to the sum of
new capital created and the rest of what is left at the capital stock at time
t after depreciation.
3.2.2 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral operators who produce wholesale goods and
need some external financing for it. Due to agency problem, the external
financing is assumed to be more expensive than internal funds. Entrepreneurs
are assumed to have finite expected horizon in a sense that they cannot
accumulate enough funds to fully finance their own needs. Each entrepreneur
survive with the probability υ, which gives the expected horizon 1
1−υ . The
amount of entrepreneurs is assumed to be stationary: new entrepreneurs
replace the ones who exit.
Entrepreneur’s production function is typical Cobb Douglas, combining





where the technology shock At follows stationary AR(1)-process, affecting all
entrepreneurs equally.
Their demand for capital depends on the expected marginal returns and
costs. Hence, in the optimal capital demand function, the expected marginal
return of capital is equal to the cost, i.e.:
Etft+1 = Et




where zt+1 denotes the marginal productivity of capital at t+ 1, δ being
the capital depreciation rate, and qt being the real value of capital at the
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period t.
The price of external finance premium S(·) depends on the entrepreneur’s
net worth nt and leverage ratio, i.e. S(·) = S( nt+1qtkt+1 ). Entrepreneur’s net
worth evolves according to:
nt+1 = vυt + (1− v)gt, (16)
where υt is the net worth of surviving entrepreneurs, 1− v is the proportion
of new ones entering the economy and gt is a lump sum new entrepreneurs
receive from the ones who depart the economy. The net worth of surviving
entrepreneurs is calculated as:
υt =
[
ftqt−1kt − Et−1ft(qt−1kt − nt)
]
, (17)
where the first term is the ex post return on capital held and the latter,
(Et−1ft)(·) denotes the cost of borrowing in previous period t− 1.
The premium is inversely correlated with entrepreneur’s net worth. For
simplicity, all entrepreneurs choose the same leverage ratio. Consequently,
the external finance premium depends only on the aggregate leverage ratio
and not on entrepreneur-specific factors. As their relative indebtedness rises,
the loand becomes more risky and the cost of external capital increases. By







Log-linerizing the equation (16), given the form of external finance premium,
delivers:
fˆt+1 = Rˆt − pˆit+1 + ψ(qˆt + kˆt+1 − nˆt+1), (19)
where ψ denotes the elasticity of external finance premium when entrepreneur’s
relative indebtedness changes.
Finally, entrepreneurs maximize their profits according to the first order













where ξt is the Langrangian multiplier denoting marginal cost, wt being
the wage and zt the marginal productivity of capital.
3.2.3 Retailers
Retailers buy wholesale goods from the entrepreneurs, differentiate the goods
a little, and finally sell the products in the markets. They are monopolistically
competitive agents who are presented as a continuum. The retail sector
is incorporated in order to obtain inflation inertia through Calvo pricing,
where the retailers can adjust their expected optimal pricing with a certain
probability (1− φ)12.





the retailer j who can adjust their pricing at time t chooses prices p˜t according




























12This also means that the proportion φ of retailers who cannot change their pricing
must charge according to the previously estimated prices and inflation.
13Demand function of the retailer j
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Given also the aggregate price function, p1−θt = φ(pipt−1)
1−θ+(1−φ)p˜1−θt ,
these functions delivers the following log-formed New Keynesian Phillips
Curve:




where ξt denotes the real marginal cost.
3.3 Government and Monetary Policy
The country’s central bank can adjust the nominal interest rate, Rt in response
to devations of inflation, money-growth rate, and output. This section of the
model does not perfectly match the monetary conditions of Thailand in 1997
as it excludes the exchange rate policies. However, given the firm consensus
on the effects of different exchange rate policies described in the literature
review -section, it is safe to assume that the common conclusion regarding
flexible exchange rate’s superiority is sound. Despite the lack of including
specific exchange rate policy-functions in the model, it takes into account
other important aspects of the crisis, such as suddenly rising interest rates
and the following debt-deflation with financial accelerator mechanism, and
hence delivers a decent basis for simulating the crisis.
In the model, monetary policy is conducted via the changes in nominal
interest rate (Rt), which responses to fluctuations in the steady state -levels
of inflation (pit), money growth rate (µt =
Mt
Mt−1












where exp(εRt) is the monetary policy shock and %pi, %y and %µ are the
policy coefficients for inflation, output, and money-growth rate, respectively.
These coefficients are chosen by the central bank.
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4 Steady-State equilibrium and the log-linearized
system
Given the nature of the study, the model’s steady-state -form14 must be
acquired in order to see the abnormal deviations from the normal situation.














































14Steady-state equilibrium means that the economy is in stable situation in its steady or
mildly growing path, where, for example, the capital growth rate equals the depreciation
rate, i.e. kt+1 = kt, etc.
15As the model is the same as Christensen & Dip (2007), the steady-state equilibrium
and the log-linearized system are equivalent to those shown at their Appendix.
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i = δk.
In addition, the whole model must be log-linearized in order to acquire
the deviations to be shown in percentages16 rather than in absolute terms.
The log-linearized model typed into Dynare is given as:
(
(1− γ)λc− 1)cˆt = γλˆt + λm(R− 1)
R
(bˆt + (γ − 1)mˆt)− γeˆt;
γRˆt
(R− 1) = bˆt + cˆt − mˆt;
hhˆt = (1− h)(wˆt + λˆt);
yˆt = αkˆt + (1− α)hˆt + (1− α)Aˆt;
yyˆt = ccˆt + iˆit;
wˆt = yˆt + ξˆt − hˆt;
zˆt = yˆt + ξˆt − kˆt;
mˆut = mˆt − mˆt−1 + pˆit;








qˆt = χ(ˆit − kˆt)− xˆt;




λˆt+1 = λˆt − Rˆt + pˆit+1;
kˆt+1 = δiˆt + δxˆt + (1− δ)kˆt;





















The model will be calibrated in order to acquire decent correctness of the
dynamics and the magnitude of the crisis. Some of the basic parameter-values
are set according to ”textbook” -standards. Rest of the parameter-values are
a mixture of Christensen & Dip (2007), Gertler et al. (2007), and Thailand’s
Central Bank’s estimates17.
The values for discount factor β and depreciation rate δ are 0.9926 and
0.0105, respectively. These values are Thailand’s central bank’s estimations.
The beta-value 0.9926 corresponds to real interest rate of 3% per year and
the delta-value of 0.0105 corresponds to 4.2% annual depreciation rate. The
share of capital α is given the typical value of 0.33
As Gertler et al. (2007) pointed out, the shock to borrowing premium
is technically equivalent to a shock to interest rate. Hence, the crisis is
simulated via unanticipated upward shock to the interest rate r with standard
deviation of 1. The financial accelerator mechanism, ψ, is given the value of
0.05, which is also used by Bernanke et al (1999). Christensen $ Dip (2007)
used 0.042, but their study was calibrated to US economy. Given the nature
of the smaller economy of Thailand, a higher value is more suitable. By
setting a higher value for ψ, the accelerator mechanism affects more severely.
The parameter value for external finance premium is set to 1.0075, which
was used in both of the studies.
The coefficients for responses to deviations in monetary policy function
is a mixture of Gertler et al. (2007) and Christensen & Dip (2007). The
coefficients for output gap %y and inflation gap %pi are 2 and 0.75, respectively.
These values comes from the Korean economy during the Asian Crisis. However,
due to the similarity of these economies, they are likely to provide a decent
approximation for Thailand’s situation. The coefficient for money growth
rate is set to 0.65. The steady-state inflation rate is set to 1.0074, according
to the central bank. This corresponds to 3% annual inflation.
The parameter for capital adjustment cost χ is set to 0.59 according to
17Tanboon, S. (2008). The Bank of Thailand Structural Model for Policy Analysis.
Bank of Thailand Discussion paper.
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Christensen & Dip (2007). As pointed out in the same paper, the value for
capital adjustment cost plays an important role in a system with financial
accelerator. Had the adjustment cost been set higher, the capital price would
respond to shocks with a greater magnitude and further having a greater
impact on the net worth of firms.
The survival rate of entrepreneurs ν is 0.9728. The same value was also
used by Bernanke et al (1999). The value for price stickiness φ is set to 0.75.
In practice this means that on average, the prices are estimated to be fixed
for a year. The ratio of entrepreneurs’ capital to their net worth k
n
is 1.8.
This is a intermediate value of Gertler et al. (2007) and Christensen % Dip
(2007), who used 1.1 and 2, respectively. Gertler et al. (2007) points out,
that their ratio is twice as high as the historical U.S average. But given the
high indebtedness in Asia during the crisis, a high leverage ratio is suitable.
Given the form of the model and to financial accelerator to work correctly,
the value must be higher than 1.
The rest of the parameters and constant-values are the same as Christensen
& Dip (2007): Weight of leisure in the utility function η equals 1.315, which
corresponds to household spending one third of its time in market activities.
Constant elasticity of substitution between consumption and real balances
γ is set to 0.05 and the langrange multiplier associated with the production
function ξ is 0.833.
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6 Model Simulation
The crisis is simulated with a normally distributed 1% unanticipated shock,
with σ = 1, to interest rate that follows AR(1) stationary process. The
coefficient for the process is 0.95. The dynamics of key economic factors
can be seen from figure 2 and the impulse response functions from figure 4.
In addition, the effects of the financial accelerator mechanism are simulated
roughly by setting the parameter-value for ψ equal to zero18. The results
from this simulation with the mechanism turned off can be seen from figure
3 and the subsequent impulse response functions from figure 5.
Following the shock, the nominal interest rate naturally jumps and the
rest of the factors decline. Output, consumption, investment, hours of work,
inflation, and net worth all decline, as expected. The output’s response is
-0.34%, which is reasonably in line with the data, given the fact that the
GDP at constant prices fell 10 percent19 and when estimating that during
the largest spike, the interest rate increased around 30 percentages20. When
turning the financial accelerator off, the output’s response is -0.29%. The
difference is not as large as in Christensen & Dip (2007) or Gertler et al.
(2007), but clearly shows that it does have an impact. In Christensen & Dip
(2007), the output’s response was -0.44% and without the mechanism -0.39%.
Investment were more sensitive to the shock, responding by -1.27%. This
seems natural as the leverage-ratio was high and deteriorating firms’ balance
sheets made additional investing difficult. The investments’ response to
the shock is highly sensitive to the given value of capital to net worth -
ratio. Had the value been set higher, as in Christensen & Dip (2007), the
investments would have fallen more sharply and vice versa. The net worth of
the companies reacts even more sensitively as the investments, by -1.56%. It
is (naturally) also extremely sensitive on the capital to net worth -ratio. As
seen from the figures below, investment and net worth do not return to their
original levels quickly. Net worth of the companies remain under steady-state
18Christensen & Dip (2007) did two different simulations without the financial
accelerator mechanism; one with readjusted parameter-values and another with the
original ones. In this simulation, the other parameter-values remain the same when
analysing the case without the mechanism.
19According to IMF database
20https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm, Chart 5
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-levels long, which was also seen in Thailand. Using rough measures, it took
three years for the economy to recover and by measuring the Thailand stock
market (SET50) index -value, it did not recover to its pre-crisis levels until
201821. Christensen & Dip (2007) estimated that investment and net worth
reacted by -1.1% and -1.4%, respectively. When turning the mechanism off,
the investment’s reaction dropped to -0.7%.
By comparing these results to data of Thailand’s investment-levels, the
sensitive reaction of -1.27% seems correct. The investment levels22 dropped
steeply; from the level of around 17 billion US dollars in early 1998 to 7
billion US dollars after the shock. The decline in the share of investments
per GDP dropped from around 36 percentages of GDP to 20 percentages.
By turning the financial accelerator off, the responses of investment and net
worth drop to -0.46% and -0.65%, respectively. Hence, the presence of the
mechanism results much larger dip within these more capital related factors,
compared to the output that was affected less. These results align with the
other key papers, Christensen & Dip (2007) and Gertler et al. (2007), as well
as with the whole idea and structure of the financial accelerator mechanism.
They also concluded that the financial accelerator has a major impact on net
worth via the dynamics explained in previous chapters.
The hours worked reacts by -0.51% and with the mechanism turned off
by -0.43%. This means that the financial accelerator does not affect working
hours so severely as investment and net worth, but nevertheless has some
impact. The difference between these effects can be explained at least partly
via the impact on net worth: When companies are hit worse in the model with
financial accelerator, the economy stalls and lose more jobs. In Christensen
& Dip (2007), hours reacted somewhat more. With the mechanism, the hours
reacted -0.67% and without by -0.7%. Hence, the hours dipped more when
turning the mechanism off, unlike in this simulation.
21It is important to point out that the pre-crisis stock market -prices were highly inflated
and the recovery plunged as the 2008 crisis occurred.
22Measured by gross fixed capital formation- and investment per GDP -datasets from
ceicdata.com. These are presented in figures 7. and 8..
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7 Concluding Remarks
In this thesis I pondered on the causes and consequences of the Asian Crisis
1997, and with the re-calibrated model of Christensen & Dip (2008), conducted
a simulation of the occurrence via an unanticipated shock to the nominal
interest rate. The model had Calvo-style nominal price rigidities and a
financial accelerator mechanism.
It was found that the major components of the crisis were highly similar to
other crisis that had happened in other emerging economies: High (foreign-
currency) indebtedness, unsound financial regulation and fixed exchange
rates with abnormal valuation. Even though this simulation did not specifically
incorporated different exchange rate regimes into the simulation, the literature
and previous DSGE-simulations draw a clear conclusion that flexible exchange
rates lessen the shock’s effects on the economy.
In addition, the large literature on the economic and political consequences
of the crisis align with one another: The impact was economically severe
and caused major changes to the political landscape as well as to the way
how business was conducted afterwards. It also had an impact on the way
democracy was valued and practiced in Asia as well as on how international
relations, especially towards western institutions, was appreciated. Before
the crisis, the ASEAN-countries were mainly authoritarian or semi-democratic,
but underwent a phase towards democratization when corrupted governments
in Thailand and Indonesia, for example, resigned under pressure. In addition
to these ruling governments, western institutions such as IMF, received critique
on its actions and interference on the crisis. Some argued that IMF’s rescue
package worsened the situation by signalling the countries’ weak conditions
to the markets. Moreover, the terms under which the package was given,
mainly demands for countries to increase taxation and cut spending, were
not always welcomed warmly. However, the countries nevertheless recovered
and continued to develop further.
The simulation of the crisis was relatively accurate. The model was typed
into Dynare in log-linearized form in order to see the following deviations from
steady-state equilibrium in percentages. The reactions and their magnitudes
the shock had on economic factors, such as output, net worth of the companies,
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and investment, were on the right level and their hump-shaped form looked
realistic. The simulation was conducted with 1% increase in interest rate,
which was technically equal to an increase in external finance premium. By
estimating that the interest rate increased about 30 percentages, the overall
real effects were able to be calculated. Even though some measurements
and data, like real decline in Thai companies’ net worth’s, was difficult to
accurately acquire, the magnitudes in overall seems correct.
For the simulation to be describing the Asian Crisis even better, one
addition for further simulations would be the inclusion of previously debated
exchange rate policies. Moreover, even though none of the models or simulations
regarding the Asian Crisis I have seen have not incorporated the external help
(IMF’s rescue packages) into calculations, it would be interesting to do so.
For example, with some predetermined parameter-values, ”an unanticipated”
help in a form of a new positive shock at some time t + n would hit the
economy and change the after-crisis course again.
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Figure 2: The economy’s response to the 1% shock with Financial accelerator
on
39
Figure 3: The economy’s response to the 1% shock with the Financial
accelerator turned off
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions of the shock
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions of the shock, Financial accelerator
turned off
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Figure 6: Thailand’s Nominal GDP from March 1993 to December 2003
Figure 7: Thailand’s Investment: % of GDP from March 1993 to December
2003
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Figure 8: Thailand’s Investment: Gross Capital Formation from March 1993
to Decemeber 2003
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